






Abstract: We study how matchmakers use prices to sort heterogeneous participants
into competing matching markets, and how equilibrium outcomes compare with monopoly
in terms of prices, matching market structure and sorting e±ciency under the assumption
of complementarity in the match value function. The role of prices to facilitate sorting is
compromised by the need to survive price competition. We show that price competition
leads to a high quality market that is insu±ciently exclusive. As a result, the duopolistic
outcome can be less e±cient in sorting than the monopoly outcome in terms of total match
value in spite of servicing more participants.
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{ i {1. Introduction
Since the seminal work on network competition by Katz and Shapiro (1985) (see also
Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Fujita, 1988), there has been a growing economic literature on
competing marketplaces. This literature re°ects the importance of network externalities in
industries ranging from telecommunications to software platforms and to credit cards. In
these industries, a competing marketplace is a network (platform) on which participants
interact, and agents' network choices have external e®ect on each other's welfare. In most
of the earlier works of the literature, the driving force is the thick market e®ect that a
larger network provides a greater chance of ¯nding a trading partner. This positive size
e®ect favors the dominance of a single marketplace, and a central question is whether
and when multiple marketplaces can coexist in equilibrium.1 Although the size e®ects
are important in network competition, in many industries network participants also care
about the identities of other participants in the same network. For example, in markets
such as job search, real estate and dating, where networks are intermediaries, participants
are heterogeneous and networks di®er not only in relative size but also in quality. In these
markets participants' network choices can have external e®ect on each other's welfare by
changing the composition and hence the quality of the network pool. This type of \sorting
externality" and its implications to price competition have been neglected in the literature
on competing marketplaces, which focuses on the size e®ects and assumes either that agents
are homogeneous or that agents' choice of network is independent of their type.2
This paper introduces a model of price competition among marketplaces in an envi-
ronment where agents have heterogeneous qualities, and where the expected quality of the
1 More recently, research in this literature has increasingly focused on two-sided marketplaces, where
participants are interested in matching with those on the other side. Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and
Ellison, Fudenberg and Mobius (2004) reexamine the coexistence of multiple networks by allowing a neg-
ative size e®ect that the agents to prefer networks with fewer competitors, Caillaud and Jullien (2001,
2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) analyze the \divide-and-conquer" strategy of subsidizing one side of
the market while recovering the loss from the other side, and Armstrong (2004) studies the implications
on price competition of \multi-homing" where participants on the two sides can choose multiple networks.
2 Ambrus and Argenziano (2004) modify the framework of Caillaud and Jullien (2001; 2003) and allow
for heterogeneous preferences. Agents have the same quality but di®er in terms of willingness to pay for
participating in a larger network. In their model, the equilibrium distribution of participant types can be
di®erent across networks, however the size e®ect remains the only externality.
{ 1 {pool of participants a®ects agents' decision of which marketplace to join. In our model,
a marketplace is a random matching market, or more speci¯cally, a meeting place where
participants randomly match with each other. We have in mind a job market or a dating
market, where agents have private information about their one-dimensional quality char-
acteristics (type), and where the match value function exhibits complementarity between
types. Since type information is private, agents self-select into matching markets based
on the prices and their expectations of the quality of the pool in the matching market.
Under the assumption of complementarity, how agents sort into the matching markets by
type has implications to e±ciency in terms of total match value. The random matching
technology we adopt implies the absence of any size e®ect. This allows us to isolate the
implications of the sorting externality introduced in this paper from the consequences of
the much studied size e®ects. We stress that our analytical framework applies equally
well to one-sided intermediary markets, such as private schools that compete with tuition
charges and country clubs that compete with membership fees. In these applications, in-
stead of random pairwise match formation in each matching market (such as a school or a
club), we can allow any form of interaction among the participants so long as the reduced
form payo® function exhibits complementarity between the individual type and the aver-
age type. Thus the present paper, by introducing price competition in an oligopoly model,
also contributes to the literature on locational choices where the peer e®ect plays a critical
role (De Bartolome, 1990; Epple and Romano, 1998).3
In section 2 we lay out the framework of duopoly price competition in a matching
environment. In our model, matchmakers use prices (subscription fees) to induce agents
to sort into di®erent matching markets. We introduce the concept of matching market
structure, which describes how agents sort into two matching markets given the two prices.
We then provide a criterion to select a unique market structure for any price pro¯le. Price
competition in a matching environment with friction di®ers from the standard Bertrand
models because prices also play the role of sorting heterogeneous agent types into di®erent
3 As a model of one-sided intermediated market, our paper is also related to the literature on demand
externalities and pricing (Karni and Levin, 1994; Rayo, forthcoming), and to the literature on clubs (Cole
and Prescott, 1997).
{ 2 {matching markets. Aside from the usual strategy of lowering price to steal rivals' market
share, our selection criterion formalizes a pricing strategy called \overtaking" that is unique
to the sorting role of prices. Overtaking a rival is achieved by charging a price just higher
than the rival does, and thus providing a market with a higher quality (average agent
type). When the price di®erence is small enough, the rival's matching market loses all its
customers because quality di®erence dominates.
Section 3 contains the main results of the paper. No pure-strategy equilibrium exists
in the simultaneous-move pricing game, because for any price pro¯le at least one of the
matchmaker has an incentive to drive its rival out of the market by using the overtaking
strategy. We provide a su±cient condition for the two matchmakers to coexist in the
equilibrium of the sequential-move version of the pricing game. This condition requires
the type distribution to be su±ciently di®used so that the ¯rst mover can create a niche
market for the low types to survive the overtaking strategy of the second mover, which in
equilibrium serves the higher types. With the assumption of uniform type distribution,
we show that at the equilibrium outcome of the duopoly competition the total market
coverage is greater than the optimal total coverage under a monopolist that maximizes
revenue from two matching markets, because the ¯rst mover must lower its price to prevent
overtaking. However, the equilibrium outcome involves ine±cient sorting compared to the
monopoly outcome, because competition results in an insu±ciently exclusive high quality
matching market. When the type distribution is tight, the matching market structure is
less e±cient overall under competition than under monopoly, as the loss from ine±cient
sorting outweighs the gain from a greater coverage. We conclude our analysis with a
brief discussion of the robustness of our main results when the type distribution is non
uniform, and when more than two matching markets are created. Section 4 provides further
remarks on the existing literature and the implications of our results to regulatory policies
in intermediated markets. Proofs of all lemmas can be found in the appendix.
2. A Duopoly Model of Competing Matchmakers
Consider a two-sided matching environment. Agents of the two sides have heterogeneous
one-dimensional characteristics, called \types." For simplicity, we assume that the two
{ 3 {sides have the same size and the same type distribution function F, with a support [a;b] µ
IR+, and a di®erentiable density function f. We assume that a > 0 and b is ¯nite; the
following analysis carries through with appropriate modi¯cations if a = 0 or b = 1, and
all our results hold without change.
Two matchmakers, unable to observe types of agents, use prices (entrance fees) to
create two matching markets.4 For each i = 1;2, let pi be the price charged by matchmaker
i. Given p1 and p2, agents simultaneously choose one from three options: participate in
matchmaker 1's matching market, participate in 2's market, and not participate. In each
matching market, agents are randomly pairwise matched. Random matching means that
the probability that a type x agent meets an agent from the other side whose type is in
some set equals the proportion of matching market participants whose type belongs to the
set. We assume that matching markets are costless to organize, and each matchmaker's
objective is to maximize the sum of entrance fees collected from participants.5
A match between a type x agent and a type y agent from the other side produces
a value of xy to both of them. This match value function satis¯es the standard comple-
mentarity condition (positive cross partial derivatives); this implies that in a frictionless
matching environment, the total match value is maximized by matching equal types of
agents. Let mi, i = 1;2, be the expected type (average quality) in the matching market
created by matchmaker i; the qualities m1 and m2 are endogenously determined in equi-
librium by p1 and p2, and the participation choices of the agents. The utility of a type x
agent from participating in matching market i is then xmi ¡ pi. Unmatched agents get a
payo® of 0 regardless of type.
2.1. Matching market structures
First we examine the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous move game played by the agents
for given prices p1 and p2. For concreteness, we refer to each equilibrium as a \matching
4 Due to the assumptions of symmetry and random pairwise meeting, in our model each participant
in a matching market is matched with probability 1. If the meeting technology is such that the probability
of forming a match is less than 1, then the prices should be understood as usage fees that are paid only if
a successful match is made, and all analysis remains unchanged.
5 The same framework can be used to analyze the optimal pricing of a single matchmaker that competes
with a free-access matching market. See our earlier paper, Damiano and Li (forthcoming).
{ 4 {market structure." Since our model is symmetric with respect to the two sides, we restrict
our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria, with each matching market hosting an equal
number of participants with identical support from the two sides. For any c;c0 2 [a;b] with
c < c0, let ¹(c;c0) be the mean type on the interval [c;c0], and denote ¹(c;c) = c.
One \singular matching market structure," denoted as S1, is that agents participate
in matching market 1 only. The participation threshold c1 for matching market 1 is
determined by (
c1¹(c1;b) = p1 if p1 2 [a¹(a;b);b2];
c1 = a if p1 2 [0;a¹(a;b)).
(2:1)
The average quality m1 of matching market 1 is ¹(c1;b), and the threshold participation
type is either a type c1, which is indi®erent between participating in matching market 1
and not participating (when p1 ¸ a¹(a;b)), or the lowest type a, which strictly prefers
participation (when p1 < a¹(a;b)). In both cases, all types higher than the threshold type
strictly prefer to participate in matching market 1. The other singular matching market
structure, denoted as S2, is that agents participate in matching market 2 only; the average
quality m2 and the participation threshold c2 are similarly determined.
When p1 < p2 · b2, the prices may also support a \dual matching market structure,"
denoted as D12. Either there exist participation thresholds c1 and c2, with a · c1 < c2,
such that
c1¹(c1;c2) = p1;
c2(¹(c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;c2)) = p2 ¡ p1;
(2:2)
or there is c2 such that
a¹(a;c2) > p1;
c2(¹(c2;b) ¡ ¹(a;c2)) = p2 ¡ p1:
(2:3)
In both cases above, the average quality of matching market 2 is m2 = ¹(c2;b), and the
threshold type c2 is indi®erent between the two markets. In the ¯rst case, the threshold
type c1 is indi®erent between participating in matching market 1 with the average quality
m1 = ¹(c1;c2) and not participating at all, while in the second case, type c1 is the lowest
type a and it strictly prefers participating in matching market 1 with m1 = ¹(a;c2).
Whether a pair of prices p1 and p2 with p2 < p1 supports a symmetric dual matching
market structure, denoted as D21, is determined similarly.
{ 5 {The assumption of complementarity in the match value function implies that partici-
pation decisions can be described by thresholds, and in any dual matching market structure
higher types join the more expensive market. As a result, the two singular matching mar-
ket structures and the dual structure, together with the \null matching market structure"
where agents participate in neither matching market, cover all possible equilibrium match-
ing market structures.6
We now make an assumption which for each p1 2 [0;b2] allows to determine a price
range [µ(p1);¸(p1)] for prices p2 > p1, such that the dual matching market structure D12
cannot be supported for any p2 < µ(p1) or p2 > ¸(p1) and there is a unique D12 for any









p1) if p1 ¸ a2;
p1 + a(¹(a;b) ¡ a) if p1 < a2 (2:4)
and the upper bound ¸(p1) is given by
¸(p1) =
(
p1 + b(b ¡ ¹(c1;b)) if p1 ¸ a¹(a;b);
p1 + b(b ¡ ¹(a;b)) if p1 < a¹(a;b),
(2:5)
where c1 is uniquely determined by c1¹(c1;b) = p1 in the ¯rst case of (2.5). The assumption
we will make (Assumption 2.1 below) implies that ¹(t;x0) ¡ ¹(x;t) is a non-decreasing
function in t for any t 2 (x;x0) ½ [a;b]. To see the su±ciency of this monotonicity condition
on the di®erence of conditional means, take for example the case of p1 ¸ a¹(a;b). At
p2 = µ(p1), equation (2.2) is satis¯ed by c1 = c2 =
p
p1; under the monotonicity condition,
as p2 decreases c2 decreases while c1 increases, and thus there is no solution in c1 and
c2 with c1 < c2 if p2 < µ(p1). Similarly, at p2 = ¸(p1), equation (2.2) is satis¯ed by
c2 = b and c1 such that c1¹(c1;b) = p1; under the monotonicity condition, there is no
solution in c1 and c2 to equations (2.2) if p2 > ¸(p1). Lastly, for p2 2 [µ(p1);¸(p1)], the
monotonicity condition implies that there is a unique pair of participation thresholds c1
and c2 that satis¯es equation (2.2). The cases of p1 < a2 and p1 2 [a2;a¹(a;b)) can be
similarly established. A symmetric argument holds for D21.
6 When p1 = p2, for the participation threshold c that satis¯es (2.1), any strategy pro¯le such that
types above c join one of the two markets and m1 = m2 forms a Nash equilibrium. We assume that the
two matchmakers evenly split the types above c; the analysis is una®ected by this assumption.
{ 6 {To derive a restriction on F that ensures that ¹(t;x0) ¡¹(x;t) is non-decreasing in t,
let ¹l be the partial derivative of ¹(x;x0) with respect to x, and ¹r be the derivative with








Note that ¹l(t;x0) converges to 1
2 as x0 approaches t.7 Further, the derivative of ¹l(t;x0)
with respect to x0 has the same sign as 1
2(t+x0)¡¹(t;x0), which is non-negative if f0(¢) · 0.
Thus, ¹l(t;x0) ¸ 1
2 if f0(¢) · 0. Similarly, ¹r(x;t) converges to 1
2 as x approaches t, and is
non-decreasing in x if f0(¢) · 0, implying that ¹r(x;t) · 1
2. Non-increasing density is thus
su±cient to imply that ¹(t;x0) ¡ ¹(x;t) is non-decreasing in t as ¹l(t;x0) ¸ 1
2 ¸ ¹r(x;t).
We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The density function f is non-increasing.
For the analysis that we will carry out, we also need the standard assumption of
monotone hazard rate. Let ½(¢) = (1 ¡ F(¢))=f(¢) be the inverse hazard rate function. We
assume that ½0(¢) · 0. This is equivalent to the assumption that the right tail distribution
function 1 ¡ F(¢) is log-concave, which implies that the conditional mean function ¹(t;b)
satis¯es ¹l(t;b) · 1 (An, 1998).
Assumption 2.2. The hazard rate function of F is non-decreasing.
The uniform distribution and the exponential distribution are the two polar cases that
satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. The uniform distribution on [a;b] has a constant density,
while the hazard rate is strictly increasing. The exponential distribution on [a;1) has a
strictly decreasing density, while the hazard rate is constant.
2.2. Selection of matching market structures
Unlike in standard Bertrand price competition, in a matching environment participation
decisions of agents are not completely determined by prices. What an entrance fee buys
7 The derivative @¹(t;x0)=@t at x0 = t can be calculated using L'Hospital rule and solving for it from
the resulting equation. It is equal to 1
2 because a continuous density is locally uniform.
{ 7 {for agents on one side of the matching market depends on participation decisions by the
agents on the other side of the market. Nash equilibrium alone does not pin down the
matching market structure. It is possible to have multiple matching market structures for
a given pair of prices. Indeed, from equations (2.1), for any p1;p2 2 [0;b2], both the two
singular matching market structures S1 and S2 can be supported as equilibrium.
We adopt as our selection criterion the notion of \stable set of equilibria" of Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986). Their notion is a strengthening of trembling hand perfection in
strategic-form games (Selten, 1975), and is derived from robustness considerations in per-
turbed games where agents are constrained to non-optimal participation decisions (trem-
bles) with increasingly small probabilities. Loosely speaking, in our model a collection of
matching market structures constitutes a stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens
if it is a minimal collection with the property that every perturbed game has a Nash equi-
librium close to some matching market structure in the collection. In the appendix, we
give a formal de¯nition of the notion of a stable collection of matching market structures
and prove the following result.8
Lemma 2.3. Assume p1 < p2. The unique stable collection of matching market structures
is a singleton, and contains (i) S2 if p2 < µ(p1), (ii) D12 if µ(p1) < p2 < ¸(p1), and (iii) S1
if p2 > ¸(p1).
Stability in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens makes a unique selection of matching
market structure, even though the concept is a set-based re¯nement as in general di®erent
equilibria are needed to provide robustness against di®erent perturbed games. To under-
stand this strong result, let us consider case (i) where p2 2 (p1;µ(p1)). In this case, the
price di®erence is too small to support the dual matching market structure D12, and the
unique selection is the high-price singular market structure S2. The low-price singular
structure S1 is not robust. This is because any perturbation in which high types are over-
represented in the high-price market would create a high quality there, and since the price
di®erence is small, would further attract high types. As high types leave the low-price
8 At the boundary between S2 and D12 (when p2 = µ(p1)), the two matching market structures are
both stable, but since they are outcome-equivalent, which one is selected is immaterial to our analysis. A











market, its quality decreases. This induces further deviations that unravel the low-price
singular market structure.9 In contrast, the high-price structure S2 is robust. In any
perturbation, the ¯rst types to deviate to the low-price market are the low types, which
drives up the quality di®erence between the two markets and limits further deviations.
By a symmetric argument a unique matching market structure is selected when p1 >
p2. Figure 1 depicts the selected matching market structure for the case in which types
are uniformly distributed on [a;b]. The dashed line represents the border between the
region with high prices and full participation, with c1 = a, and low prices and partial
participation, with c1 > a. We refer to case (i) in Lemma 2.3 as matchmaker 2 \overtaking"
matchmaker 1, and case (iii) as matchmaker 1 \undercutting" matchmaker 2. The strategy
of overtaking is unique to the sorting role of prices. Overtaking a rival is achieved by
charging an appropriately higher price than the rival does. This provides a higher quality
market, inducing deviation from the rival's market by the highest types, which triggers
further deviations by lower type agents and eventually drives out the rival. The overtaking
strategy plays on the di®erences in willingness to pay for quality (average match type)
between the highest and the lowest type agents participating in a market.
9 A similar argument can be made if we adapt the concept of most likely deviating type from Banks
and Sobel's (1987) theory of re¯nement in extensive games. In the low-price singular structure S1, the
type that is the most likely to deviate to the high-price market is the highest type b. If p2 < µ(p1), type b
agents would indeed want to deviate if they expect a su±ciently high quality in the high-price market.
{ 9 {3. Duopolistic Sorting
In this section we analyze the equilibrium outcome under duopolistic competition. First
we have that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the simultaneous-move pricing game,
because each matchmaker can drive the rival out of the market by overtaking.
Lemma 3.1. There is no pure-strategy equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game.
The non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in the simultaneous-move game points
to a di®erence between competing matchmaking and the standard Bertrand price compe-
tition. As in Bertrand competition, payo® discontinuities exist in competing matchmaking
because the matching market structure switches from one singular matching market struc-
ture to the other singular market structure when prices move from p1 just below p2 to p1
just above p2. Payo® discontinuities tend to homogenize prices in the absence of any asym-
metry between the competitors. While in Bertrand competition this leads to marginal cost
pricing, the same is not true in competing matchmaking because prices also play the role of
sorting. If one matchmaker charges zero price, the other matchmaker can charge a price in
the region of dual market structure and earn a strictly positive revenue by sorting out the
types willing to pay more for a higher match quality. Rather than studying mixed-strategy
equilibria in a simultaneous-move game, we look at pure-strategy (subgame perfect) equi-
libria in a sequential-move game.10 We consider below a game where matchmaker 1 ¯rst
picks a price p1, and matchmaker 2 then chooses p2 after observing p1.
3.1. Surviving overtaking
Because of the overtaking strategy, matchmaker 2 has an advantage in the sequential-move
game. We want to know whether this advantage is so overwhelming that matchmaker 1
cannot survive as a ¯rst mover. A possible strategy for matchmaker 1 to survive overtaking
10 Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be established using the concept of payo®-security
of Reny (1999). By charging a slightly higher price each matchmaker can secure a payo® at worst only
marginally lower against small perturbations of its rival's price. It follows that the mixed extension of our
simultaneous-move game is payo®-secure, and therefore a mixed strategy equilibrium in prices exists (see
Corollary 5.2 in Reny, 1999).
{ 10 {is to choose a price so low that matchmaker 2 ¯nds more pro¯table creating a more
exclusive matching market rather than overtaking matchmaker 1 and driving it out of
the competition. We say that the type distribution is \su±ciently di®used" if ¹(a;b) >
3
2a. Intuitively, when the type distribution is su±ciently di®used, there is room for two
matchmakers to coexist, because the lowest type's willingness to pay for a higher quality
match is low relative to higher type agents. When matchmaker 1 posts a su±ciently low
price, overtaking e®ectively entails serving the entire market. The opportunity cost of
overtaking is high since by focusing on a more exclusive matching market, matchmaker 2
could charge a much higher participation fee.
Proposition 3.2. If the type distribution is su±ciently di®used, there exists a pure-
strategy equilibrium with a dual matching market structure in a sequential-move game.
Proof. Fix any p1 < a2. First, note that undercutting is dominated by overtaking
for matchmaker 2. This is because in both cases, matchmaker 2 will serve all types, and
overtaking generates a greater revenue with a higher price. It remains to show that for
p1 su±ciently small, it is not optimal for matchmaker 2 to drive matchmaker 1 out of
the market by overtaking. By equation (2.1), the singular matching market structure S2
obtains for any p2 2 (p1;µ(p1)]. The threshold type of participation is c2 = a because
p1 < a2 implies µ(p1) < a¹(a;b). Matchmaker 2's revenue from overtaking is simply p2
for any p2 2 (p1;µ(p1)], so the best overtaking price is µ(p1). For any p2 2 (µ(p1);¸(p1)),
the dual matching market structure D12 obtains. By equation (2.3), c1 = a, and c2
satis¯es c2(¹(c2;b) ¡ ¹(a;c2)) = p2 ¡ p1. Consider how matchmaker 2's revenue in the
dual matching market structure D12, given by p2(1¡F(c2)), changes at p2 = µ(p1). Since
c2 = a at p2 = µ(p1), the derivative of matchmaker 2's revenue with respect to p2 at µ(p1)
is positive if and only if
¹(a;b) ¡ a + a
µ





As p1 approaches 0, µ(p1) approaches a(¹(a;b) ¡ a). Thus, the derivative is positive at
p2 = µ(p1) for p1 approaching 0, if and only if ¹(a;b) > 3
2a. Q.E.D.
A su±ciently di®used distribution allows the ¯rst mover to survive the overtaking
strategy of the second mover by focusing on a lower quality \niche" market. Note that
{ 11 {the survival strategy of charging p1 < a2 for the ¯rst mover implies that all low types are
served and some rents are left to the lowest type a with a relaxed participation constraint.
Further, the su±cient condition of Proposition 3.2 depends on the type distribution only
through the unconditional mean ¹(a;b). This is because at the boundary between S2 and
D12 the behavior of matchmaker 2's revenue is independent of the type distribution, and
is locally identical to that under the uniform type distribution.
3.2. Niche market
Proposition 3.2 provides a su±cient condition for the two matchmakers to coexist in an
equilibrium, by considering the second mover's incentives to overtake the ¯rst mover when
the latter charges a su±ciently low price. The analysis leaves open the possibility that, in
equilibrium, both matchmakers have positive market shares and the ¯rst mover charges a
higher price. We investigate this possibility in this subsection.
We will need a result about the revenue function of a one-price monopolist, (1¡F(c))p,
where c is determined by p through equation (2.1). In the appendix we prove that the
revenue function is quasi-concave in price p (Lemma A.1). Let ^ p be the solution to the
one-price monopolist's revenue maximization problem. We have the following result.
Lemma 3.3. Under the uniform type distribution, for any p1 such that µ(p1) > ^ p, any
best response p2 of matchmaker 2 leaves zero revenue to matchmaker 1.
Clearly the optimal response of matchmaker 2 is ^ p if it is a feasible undercutting or
overtaking price, which happens when p1 2 (¸(^ p);b2] and p1 2 (µ¡1(^ p); ^ p) respectively.
This leaves zero revenue to matchmaker 1. When p1 2 [^ p;¸(^ p)], the maximum one-price
monopolist revenue is not feasible. However, since p1 > ^ p > µ¡1(^ p), overtaking match-
maker 1 dominates serving the higher quality market in a dual structure D12. To see this,
note that any price p2 2 (µ(p1);¸(p1)) that supports D12 leads to a duopolist's revenue,
which is lower than the one-price monopolist's revenue at the same price p2 because the
latter has a greater market share. Since µ(p1) > ^ p, the quasi-concavity of the revenue
function of the one-price monopolist implies that this is in turn lower than the overtak-
ing revenue reached by charging µ(p1). The proof of Lemma 3.3 uses the assumption of
{ 12 {uniform type distribution to rule out serving the lower quality market in a dual structure
D21 by showing that it is dominated by either overtaking or undercutting. In either case,
matchmaker 1 gets zero revenue. The next result follows from Lemma 3.3 immediately.
Proposition 3.4. Under the uniform type distribution, in any equilibrium with a dual
matching market structure, the ¯rst mover serves the lower quality matching market.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, under the uniform type distribution, in any equilibrium with a
dual matching market structure, we must have p1 · µ¡1(^ p). We claim that matchmaker 2's
best response p2 belongs to the interval [µ(p1);¸(p1)). The proposition then immediately
follows this claim, because either there is no equilibrium with a dual market structure if
p2 = µ(p1), or else D12 is the equilibrium market structure. To establish the claim, note
that charging p2 2 [¸(p1);b2] cannot be optimal because matchmaker 2 would have zero
revenue. If instead matchmaker 2 chooses p2 2 [0;µ(p1)), there are most three possible
scenarios. When the price pair (p1;p2) falls in the S1 region, matchmaker 2 has no revenue.
When the (p1;p2) falls in the S2 region, matchmaker 2 is a monopolist. However at price
p2 = µ(p1), matchmaker 2 is also a monopolist but has a higher revenue because µ(p1) · ^ p
and because the revenue function of the monopolist is quasi-concave. Finally, when (p1;p2)
falls in the D21 region, matchmaker 2's revenue is lower than the revenue of a one-price
monopolist at the same price p2, which is lower than the revenue generated by charging
p2 = µ(p1) due to the quasi-concavity. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.4 shows that when matchmaker 1 chooses a low price p1 such that
µ(p1) · ^ p, matchmaker 2's best response is either charging the maximum overtaking price
µ(p1) or serving the higher quality market in a dual structure D12. Note that this result
holds regardless of the type distribution. While Lemma 3.3, and hence the conclusion
of Proposition 3.4, does depend on the assumption of the uniform type distribution, the
intuition behind it is more general. By charging a very low price, or a very high price,
the ¯rst mover targets a niche market of few types and makes the overtaking strategy
unappealing to the second mover. However, while a high price might invite undercutting,
a low price is less vulnerable. Indeed, under the uniform type distribution, if the ¯rst mover
charges a price high enough to deter overtaking, the second mover will ¯nd it optimal to
{ 13 {undercut. Thus, to deter undercutting as well as overtaking, matchmaker 1 has to ¯nd its
niche market with low prices.
3.3. Market coverage
To study the e®ects on competition, we compare our duopoly model with a two-price
monopoly matchmaker. This is a natural comparison because the number of potential
matching markers is two in both cases. The monopolist's problem can be stated as choosing
two participation thresholds, c1 and c2, with c1 · c2, to maximize the total revenue:11
(1 ¡ F(c1))c1¹(c1;c2) + (1 ¡ F(c2))c2(¹(c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;c2)): (3:2)
In this subsection we consider how competition a®ects the total matching market coverage,
i.e. the lower participation threshold.
Proposition 3.5. In any equilibrium with the dual structure D12 the market coverage is
at least as large as in the optimal structure of a monopolist if matchmaker 2's revenue is
quasi-concave in c2 for any p1.
Proof. Rewrite the revenue of the monopolist (equation 3.2) as
((1 ¡ F(c1))c1 ¡ (1 ¡ F(c2))c2)¹(c1;c2) + (1 ¡ F(c2))c2¹(c2;b): (3:3)
Since the ¯rst term in the above expression can be made arbitrarily small with c1 just
below c2, the optimal thresholds ^ c1 and ^ c2 satisfy
(1 ¡ F(^ c1))^ c1 ¸ (1 ¡ F(^ c2))^ c2: (3:4)
Di®erentiating (3.3) with respect to c1, and assuming an interior ^ c1, we ¯nd:
1 ¡ F(^ c2)
F(^ c2) ¡ F(^ c1)
(^ c2 ¡ ^ c1) =
½(^ c1)¹(^ c1;^ c2) ¡ ^ c2
1
¹(^ c1;^ c2) ¡ ^ c1
:
11 The proof of Lemma 3.10 in the appendix shows that the monopolist will always choose prices
such that a dual matching market structure obtains. Thus, applying the selection criterion introduced in
section 2 we can use participation thresholds (as opposed to prices) as choice variables for the monopolist's
revenue-maximization problem.
{ 14 {If ½(^ c1) > ^ c1, then the right-hand-side of the above condition is greater than ^ c1, resulting
in an inequality that contradicts (3.4). Thus, ½(^ c1) · ^ c1.
For duopolistic coverage, matchmaker 2 chooses c2 to maximize its revenue
(1 ¡ F(c2))(p1 + c2(¹(c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;c2))) (3:5)
subject to (
c1¹(c1;c2) = p1 if c1 > a;
a¹(a;c2) ¸ p1 if c1 = a.
(3:6)
It su±ces to consider the case where c1 is greater than a and determined by (3.6) at some







Since matchmaker 2's revenue function is quasi-concave in c2, a necessary condition for
equilibrium is that matchmaker 2's revenue increases with c2 at the boundary between S2
and D12 where c2 = c1 and p2 = µ(~ p1). At this point, equation (3.7) becomes dc1=dc2 = ¡1
3
as ¹l = ¹r = 1
2 at the boundary, and by taking derivatives of (3.5) we ¯nd that this










Since ¹l(c;b) · 1 by Assumption 2.2, (2.6) implies that for any c we have
¹(c;b) ¡ c · ½(c): (3:9)
Thus, condition (3.8) can be satis¯ed only if ½(~ c1) > ~ c1. The proposition then follows
immediately from Assumption 2.2. Q.E.D.
Without the assumption of quasi-concavity, condition (3.8) is generally not necessary
for an equilibrium dual market structure, because matchmaker 2's revenue may decrease
with c2 at the boundary between S2 and D12 and yet there is a price p2 in the D12 region
that dominates any overtaking price. In the appendix we show that, under uniform type
distribution, matchmaker 2's revenue is globally concave in c2 for any p1 in the D12 region
{ 15 {(Lemma A.2). Moreover, by Proposition 3.4, under the same assumption any equilibrium
dual market structure is D12 . Thus we have the following result.
Corollary 3.6. If the type distribution is uniform, then in any equilibrium with a
dual matching market structure the market coverage is at least as large as in the optimal
structure of a monopolist.
The intuition behind the above result is more general than implied by the uniform
type distribution. Competition expands the total market coverage because of the need for
the ¯rst mover to survive price competition. Only by lowering its price su±ciently and
catering to a low quality matching market can the ¯rst mover prevent overtaking.
3.4. Market di®erentiation
In this subsection, we ask how the equilibrium market di®erentiation, in terms of how
exclusive the high quality matching market is, compares with the optimal market di®er-
entiation that maximizes the total revenue for the two-price monopolist.
Definition 1. A dual matching market structure with c1 < c2 has a greater conditional
market di®erentiation than another one with c0
1 < c0
2 if c1 = c0
1 and c2 > c0
2.
De¯nition 1 limits our comparison of matching market structures to those with the
same market coverage. We drop the quali¯er \conditional" when there is no risk of confu-
sion. Market di®erentiation here does not refer to the comparison in terms of the quality
di®erence m2 ¡ m1 between the two markets. Instead, it describes how exclusive the high
quality matching market is: a dual matching market structure has a greater di®erentiation
if c2(m2 ¡ m1) is greater, or in words if the higher threshold c2 is willing to pay more
for the quality di®erence between the two matching market. Under Assumption 2.1, the
quality di®erence m2 ¡ m1 is non-decreasing in c2 for ¯xed c1, so this interpretation of
exclusivity coincides with De¯nition 1 above. Note that market di®erentiation in terms of
exclusivity, is what matters to revenue maximization for the two-price monopolist and the
duopolist that serves the high quality matching market. We have the following comparison
result:
{ 16 {Proposition 3.7. In any equilibrium with the dual structure D12 the equilibrium outcome
has less market di®erentiation than the optimal structure of a monopolist.
Proof. The monopolist's di®erentiation problem is to choose c2 to maximize (3.2) taking
as given c1, subject to the constraint (3.6). The ¯rst order condition can be written as
¹(^ c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;^ c2)




^ c2 ¡ c1
F(^ c2) ¡ F(c1)
: (3:10)
The right-hand-side of (3.10) approaches 1 while the left-hand-side becomes arbitrarily
large when ^ c2 takes on the value of c1, and the opposite happens when ^ c2 approaches b.
Thus, for any c1, there exists at least one ^ c2 that satis¯es (3.10). Further, the right-hand-
side is increasing ^ c2, because Assumption 2.1 implies (^ c2 ¡ c1)=(F(^ c2) ¡ F(c1)) increases
with ^ c2 while ½(^ c2) decreases with ^ c2 by Assumption 2.2. The left-hand-side decreases in
^ c2, because ¹l(^ c2;b) · 1 by Assumption 2.2. Thus, a unique ^ c2 satis¯es (3.10).
For duopolistic di®erentiation, matchmaker 2 chooses c2 to maximize (3.5) taking as
given p1, subject to (3.6). The ¯rst order necessary condition can be written as
½(~ c2)(¹(~ c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;~ c2))
~ c2 ¡ ¹(c1;~ c2)
=
1 ¡ F(c1)
F(~ c2) ¡ F(c1)
µ
1 +
¹(c1;~ c2) ¡ c1






~ c2 ¡ ¹(c1;~ c2)
;
where dc1=dc2 is given by (3.7). By Assumption 2.1, we have ¹(c1;~ c2)¡c1 · ~ c2¡¹(c1;~ c2).
Moreover, ¹r(c1;c2) · 1
2 · ¹l(c1;c2). Thus, the ¯rst order condition implies
½(~ c2)(¹(~ c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;~ c2))
~ c2 ¡ ¹(c1;~ c2)
>
1 ¡ F(c1)
F(~ c2) ¡ F(c1)
~ c2 ¡
1 ¡ F(c2)
F(~ c2) ¡ F(c1)
~ c2c1
2¹(c1;~ c2) + c1
: (3:11)
Comparing (3.11) and (3.10), we ¯nd that ~ c2 < ^ c2 for any c1 if
(2¹(c1;~ c2) + c1)(1 ¡ F(c1)) ¡ (1 ¡ F(~ c2))~ c2 ¸ 0:
Note that the above inequality holds at ~ c2 = c1. Further, the derivative of the left-hand-
side with respect to ~ c2 has the same sign as
2(1 ¡ F(c1))
~ c2 ¡ ¹(c1;~ c2)
F(~ c2) ¡ F(c1)
+ ~ c2 ¡ ½(~ c2):
The above is strictly positive as ~ c2 approaches c1 from above, and is strictly increasing in
~ c2 because (~ c2 ¡ ¹(c1;~ c2)=(F(~ c2) ¡ F(c1)) is weakly increasing in ~ c2 by Assumption 2.1,
while ½(~ c2) is weakly decreasing by Assumption 2.2. Q.E.D.
{ 17 {De¯nition 1 requires us to compare monopolistic and duopolistic di®erentiation for
¯xed market coverage. The above proof establishes that for any equilibrium coverage,
at the optimal choice of di®erentiation ~ c2 of matchmaker 2, the monopolist's revenue is
strictly increasing in c2. Since it uses only the ¯rst order necessary condition, the proof
does not require the assumption that matchmaker 2's revenue is quasi-concave. Under
uniform type distribution we can strengthen the proposition.
Corollary 3.8. If the type distribution is uniform, in any equilibrium with the dual
matching market structure the equilibrium outcome has less market di®erentiation than
the optimal structure of a monopolist.
Intuitively, when choosing its own price, matchmaker 2 does not internalize the can-
nibalization of the lower market. Rewrite the monopolist's revenue function (3.2) as
(F(c2) ¡ F(c1))p1 + (1 ¡ F(c2))(p1 + c2(¹(c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;c2))); (3:12)
and compare it with matchmaker 2's objective function (3.5). Since c1 either stays constant
at a or increases as c2 decreases according to (3.6), the ¯rst term that appears in (3.12) but
is absent from (3.5) means that duopolist matchmaker 2 has a greater incentive to lower c2
relative to the monopolist.12 Such incentive exists regardless of the type distribution. The
uniform distribution assumption is used to ensure that the equilibrium matching market
structure is D12 by way of Proposition 3.4.
3.5. Welfare comparison
To complete the comparison between duopolistic matchmaking and monopolistic match-
making, we now examine the welfare in terms of the total match value, given by
(F(c2) ¡ F(c1))¹2(c1;c2) + (1 ¡ F(c2))¹2(c2;b); (3:13)
for any pair of participation thresholds c1 and c2 with c1 · c2. A useful benchmark for the
comparison is the two-market planner's problem, which is to choose the e±cient thresholds
12 The proof of Proposition 3.7 is complicated by the fact that the constraint (3.6) has di®erent
implications to the monopolist and the duopolist matchmaker 2: the former chooses c2 for ¯xed c1 with





2, to maximize the total match value (3.13).13 First, we compare
optimal coverage ^ c1 and e±cient coverage c¤
1.
Lemma 3.9. Monopolistic market coverage is at most the e±cient coverage.
The above result that the monopolist's matching markets are smaller and more selec-
tive than the planner's does not require the assumption of uniform type distribution. In
particular, following the standard price discrimination literature, we can de¯ne \virtual
type" of x as x¡½(x). As shown in Proposition 3.5, the monopolist will never serve agents
of negative virtual types, establishing that the optimal coverage ^ c1 satis¯es ^ c1 ¸ ½(^ c1).
In contrast, the planner will service additional low types so long as the bene¯t from the
expansion of the market coverage is not outweighed by the loss due to the reduction in




1 > a, implying that ^ c1 · c¤
1 by Assumption 2.2. Next, we com-
pare the optimal market di®erentiation ^ c2 for the two-price monopolist with the e±cient
di®erentiation c¤
1 for the two-market planner under any total coverage c1.
Lemma 3.10. Monopolistic di®erentiation is e±cient if the type distribution is uniform.
For both the planner and the monopolist, increasing c2 raises the quality in both
matching markets at the expense of reducing the relative size of the higher quality mar-
ket. The e®ect on the objective functions is generally di®erent because the monopolist is
concerned with the change in the marginal type's willingness to pay, whereas the planner
cares about the change in the average expected type. Lemma 3.10 shows that the e®ect is
the same for type distributions with a linear conditional mean function ¹(¢;b), including
uniform and exponential distributions.
Since by Lemma 3.10 the monopolist and the planner have identical incentives for mar-
ket di®erentiation under the uniform type distribution, Corollary 3.8 implies that compe-
tition between the two matchmakers induces a smaller, and less e±cient, degree of market
di®erentiation. On the other hand, Lemma 3.9 establishes that the monopolist has an
13 We implicitly assume that the planner is restricted to threshold participation strategies. This may
be motivated by the assumption that the planner faces the same informational constraints.
{ 19 {ine±ciently small market coverage, and therefore by Corollary 3.6 duopolistic matchmak-
ing may correct this distortion. The trade-o® between di®erentiation and coverage then
implies that the welfare comparison between duopolistic matchmaking and monopolistic
matchmaking in terms of the total match value can go either way. The comparison gener-
ally depends on how di®used the type distribution is. For the uniform type distribution,
the degree of di®usion is determined by the value of a=b, with a lower value of the ratio
corresponding to a more di®used distribution. We have the following result.
Proposition 3.11. If the type distribution is uniform, duopolistic matchmaking generates
a smaller total match value than monopolistic matchmaking if and only if the di®usion of
the type distribution falls below a critical value.





(c2 ¡ c1)(c1 + c2)2 + (b ¡ c2)(c2 + b)2¢
:
Note that the comparison between the total match value ~ R under duopolistic matchmaking
and ^ R under monopolistic matchmaking depends on a only through its e®ects on the
equilibrium thresholds ~ c1 and ~ c2 versus the monopolist's optimal thresholds ^ c1 and ^ c2.
Under the two-price monopolist, the optimal thresholds ^ c1 and ^ c2 can be solved from
the ¯rst order conditions with respect to c1 and c2, derived from (3.2). This yields ^ c1 =
maxfa;hg and ^ c2 = 1
2(^ c1 +b), with h = b(2
p
6+3)=15. Since h > 1
2b, we have that ^ c1 and
^ c2 are constant in a for any a=b < 1
2. The total match value ^ R is then R(^ c1;^ c2).
For duopolistic matchmaking, we distinguish three cases. In the ¯rst case, a=b lies
between
p
19 ¡ 4 and 1
2. By Propositions 3.2 and 3.4, an equilibrium with a dual market
structure D12 exists. Since a necessary condition for an equilibrium with a lower threshold
~ c1 > a is condition (3.8), which under the uniform distribution becomes ~ c1 < (
p
19 ¡ 4)b,
the equilibrium satis¯es ~ c1 = a. In this case, the equilibrium higher threshold ~ c2 can be
computed explicitly by backward induction: the best response of matchmaker 2 to any p1
is c2 = b=2 ¡ p1=(b ¡ a), the equilibrium price for matchmaker 1 is ~ p1 = 1
4(b ¡ 2a)(b ¡ a),
and ¯nally ~ c2 = 1





4(b+2a)). Comparing ~ R with ^ R, we ¯nd that there is a critical value of a=b between
p
19 ¡ 4 and 1
2, such that ~ R < ^ R if and only if a=b is greater than the critical value.
{ 20 {In the second case, a=b is smaller than
p
19 ¡ 4. Explicit formulae for ~ c1 and ~ c2
are not easily obtained because we may have ~ c1 > a, but we make the following two
observations. First, if ~ c1 > a, then ~ c1 and ~ c2 are both independent of a. This is because
under the uniform type distribution, equations (3.5) and (3.6) imply that matchmaker 2's
best response does not depend on a, which in turn implies that matchmaker 1's problem
of maxp1(F(c2) ¡ F(c1))c1¹(c1;c2) does not depend on a either. Second, the equilibrium
thresholds ~ c1 and ~ c2 are continuous in the parameter a=b. Hence for some a=b ·
p
19¡4, we
have ~ R = R(~ c1;~ c2) = R(a; 1
4(b+2a)), which is strictly greater than ^ R by direct calculation.
Since ~ c1 and ~ c2 do not depend on a, we have ~ R > ^ R for all a=b such that ~ c1 > a.
In the third case, we have a=b ¸ 1
2. In the appendix, we prove that there is no
equilibrium with a dual market structure (Lemma A.3). Then, there is a continuum of
equilibria indexed by the price charged by the ¯rst mover. In any such equilibrium, the
total match value does not exceed the value achieved by a one-market planner that solves
maxc(1 ¡ F(c))¹2(c;b). Under the uniform type distribution, the planner's solution is
c¤ = a. Thus, the maximum total match value ~ R under duopolistic matchmaking is
R(a;a). It is easily veri¯ed that ^ R > R(a;a) for all a=b ¸ 1
2. Q.E.D.
The reason that the equilibrium outcome is less e±cient in sorting than the monopoly
outcome when the type distribution is not too di®used is best understood for the inter-
mediate values of a=b. In this range (more precisely, when a=b lies between
p
19 ¡ 4 and
1
2), it is e±cient to serve all types (i.e. c¤
1 = a). The monopolistic coverage is ine±ciently
small with ^ c1 > a, while its di®erentiation is e±cient. In contrast, the equilibrium outcome
has the e±cient market coverage with ~ c1 = a, but su®ers from ine±ciently small market
di®erentiation. When a=b is large in this range, the loss from insu±cient coverage under
monopoly is small relative to the gain in e±cient di®erentiation, because the optimal cov-
erage becomes close to the e±cient coverage. As a result, sorting is more e±cient overall
under monopoly than under competition. The intuition is similar for extreme values of
di®usion of the type distribution. Indeed, the trade-o® between coverage and di®eren-
tiation disappears when a=b is su±ciently high (more precisely, if a=b is greater than h,
de¯ned in the above proof), as the monopolistic coverage is e±cient while the duopolistic
di®erentiation is none because the ¯rst mover cannot survive overtaking.
{ 21 {3.6. Discussions
Our results comparing duopolistic sorting and monopolistic sorting in terms of market
di®erentiation and market coverage are obtained under the assumption of uniform type
distribution, although both the non existence of pure-strategy equilibrium in the simulta-
neous pricing game (Lemma 3.1) and the su±cient condition for existence of dual market
structure in the sequential pricing game (Proposition 3.2) hold more generally. Among
non uniform distributions of particular interest is the exponential distribution, which has
a density function exp(¡(x ¡ a)=¯)=¯ with a;¯ > 0, and which satis¯es Assumptions 2.1
and 2.2. Since the support of the type distribution is unbounded, the upper bound function
¸ is unde¯ned and undercutting is not feasible. As a result, matchmaker 1 can always sur-
vive overtaking by charging a price p1 su±ciently high so that it becomes more pro¯table
for matchmaker 2 to serve low types in the dual market structure D21. Indeed, we can
show that when a=¯ > 2, the equilibrium matching market structure is D21.14 Intuitively,
serving low types is lucrative when a is great and the type distribution is tightly concen-
trated on these types (i.e. ¯ is small). In this case, the ¯rst mover would be overtaken
by the second mover if it tries to compete for low types. This forces the ¯rst mover to
serve a niche market of high types. In this kind of equilibrium, we expect di®erentiation
to be greater under competition than under monopoly, as the second mover does not in-
ternalize the negative impact on the size of the ¯rst mover's market in increasing the lower
participation threshold. As the exponential distribution has a linear conditional mean
function, our result about the e±ciency of monopolistic market di®erentiation continues
to hold (Lemma 3.10). Thus, duopolistic di®erentiation remains less e±cient compared to
monopoly matchmaking.
A restriction in the present model of competing matchmaking is that each match-
maker is allowed to use only one price and create one matching market. We have made
14 This inequality is exactly the opposite of the condition in Proposition 3.2 for the exponential case.
When a=¯ > 2, for any price p1 below a2, the maximum revenue for matchmaker 2 as a duopolist in D12
is reached at the boundary between D12 and S2, leaving zero revenue for matchmaker 1. Moreover, in this
parameter range, the one-price monopolist's optimal price is ^ p = a(a + ¯), and so matchmaker 2's best
response to p1 2 (a2;^ p) is to overtake with price p2 = ^ p, leaving zero revenue for matchmaker 1. Finally,
for prices p1 above ^ p, the best response of matchmaker 2 is either to be a duopolist in D21 with a price
p2 < µ¡1(p1), or to overtake with a price p2 just above p1.
{ 22 {the assumption to simplify the analysis.15 The results comparing the monopolist and the
planner in terms of matching market coverage and di®erentiation turn out to be robust to
the restriction to two matching markets. In an earlier paper (Damiano and Li, forthcom-
ing), we consider the problem of a monopoly matchmaker that uses a schedule of entrance
fees to sort di®erent types of agents on the two sides of a matching market into exclu-
sive matching markets, where agents randomly form pairwise matches. That paper has
a more general setup than the model of monopolistic sorting in the present paper, with
asymmetric type distributions and an unrestricted number of matching markets.16 By the
results of Damiano and Li (forthcoming), in the present paper Assumption 2.2 is su±cient
to imply that the monopolist unconstrained in the number of matching markets has the
same incentive as the planner to perfectly sort all participating types (i.e. one market for
each participating type), while the market coverage for the monopolist is at most as large
as the e±cient full coverage for the planner. Further, it is straightforward to establish that
under the uniform type distribution for any ¯nite number of matching markets that can be
o®ered, total market coverage is at least as large for the planner as for the monopolist, and
monopolistic market di®erentiation is e±cient given the total market coverage. For price
competition, it turns out that the result of ine±cient sorting under competition (Corollary
3.8) is robust, but the extent of sorting ine±ciency depends on the number of matching
markets. In the extreme case when matchmakers can create an arbitrarily large number
of matching markets, and hence perfect sorting of all agents is possible, price competition
would not lead to ine±cient sorting, because the type distribution in each matching market
is degenerate and the overtaking strategy completely loses its power. However, as long as
types are not perfectly sorted, overtaking is possible and price competition interferes with
sorting. When choosing their pricing structure, each matchmaker fails to internalize its
e®ect on the market share of the competitors, thus leading to sorting ine±ciency.
15 McAfee (2002) shows most of the e±ciency gains in sorting can be made with a total of just two
matching markets. He does not consider the incentives of market participants.
16 Rayo (2002) studies how a monopolist can use price discrimination to sell status goods. His problem
can be interpreted as a special case of the matching model of Damiano and Li (forthcoming) by assuming
that the two sides have identical type distributions.
{ 23 {4. Concluding Remarks
Sorting of heterogeneous types is an essential ingredient in the literature on uninterme-
diated matching markets in that match formation decisions of participants in a matching
market depend on the distribution of types in the market (Burdett and Coles, 1997; Shimer
and Smith, 2000; Damiano, Li and Suen, 2005). However, as already discussed in the in-
troduction, the existing literature on competing intermediaries in matching markets has so
far ignored the issue of sorting, with the exclusive focus on the size e®ects. More broadly,
some recent papers on directed search and competitive search markets allow for type het-
erogeneity, but since there is no complementarity in a buyer-seller or worker-¯rm matching
market, prices do not play any sorting role (see Montgomery, 1991; Mortensen and Wright,
2002; Inderst, 2005). By introducing type heterogeneity into a model of competing match-
makers, we highlight a role of prices in coordinating participants' market decisions and
determining match qualities, and derive important implications of price competition to
sorting e±ciency. Our results on the potential ine±ciencies of price competition do not
suggest that competition is necessarily harmful or that monopoly is always desirable, but
they do mean that regulatory policies in a matching environment should not be exclusively
focused on enhancing price competition so as to expand market coverage. Attention must
also be paid to how price competition interacts with the sorting of heterogeneous agents.
Gains from expanding market coverage to additional low types may need to be weighed
against loss resulting from less e±cient sorting.
When perfect sorting is not feasible, price competition interferes with the sorting role
of prices. How compelling is the assumption of imperfect sorting ultimately depends on
how heterogeneous we think agents are. If only a few types of agents can be pro¯tably
distinguished, perfect sorting is likely to be feasible and the bene¯ts of competition in
terms of greater market coverage will tend to outweigh any sorting ine±ciency. In contrast,
when the type space is very rich, it is unlikely that su±ciently many matching markets
can be created to perfectly sort all agents, either because the cost of market creation is
too high or because the presence of some size e®ect makes thin markets unattractive. In
this environment the bene¯ts from sorting are large, and we may expect a monopolist to
induce a more e±cient matching market structure than competing matchmakers.
{ 24 {Appendix
A.1. Kohlberg and Mertens Stability and Proof of Lemma 2.3
In this subsection we de¯ne the notion of a stable collection of matching market structures
in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and prove Lemma 2.3. Fix any p1 and p2
with p1 < p2, and consider the simultaneous-move game of agents choosing whether to
participate in matching market 1 or 2, or not to participate. Let °² be a perturbed game
where for each type x and each of the three participation choices some fraction strictly
between 0 and ² of type x agents is constrained to that choice.
Definition 2. A collection T of matching market structures is stable if: i) for any ´ > 0,
there exists an ^ ² > 0 such that for all ² < ^ ², any game °² has a Nash equilibrium in which
at most a fraction ´ of all agents makes a participation choice di®erent from the one made
in some matching market structure in T; ii) no strict subset of T satis¯es property i).
To prove Lemma 2.3, we consider only the case of p2 > ¸(p1) where we show that
the unique stable collection is a singleton that contains S1; the other two cases can be
similarly proved. First, we show that as ² becomes small, each perturbed game °² has a
Nash equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to S1 in terms of participation decisions. Let m²
1
and m²
2 the mean quality of the agents constrained to participating in matching market 1
and 2 respectively in °². For each i = 1;2, denote as ¹²
i(t;t0) the conditional mean in the
interval (t;t0) after excluding the agents constrained to not participating or to participating
in market j 6= i. Let c²
1 solve (2.1), with ¹²
1 in place of the conditional mean in market 1.
Consider the strategy pro¯le in which unconstrained agents of types lower than c²
1 do not
participate while all other unconstrained agents participate in matching market 1. Take
any sequence of games f°²g²!0. For any such sequence and any pair of threshold t < t0,
we have ¹²
1(t;t0) converges to ¹(t;t0): For ² small, c²
1 is close to the solution to (2.1). Since
m²
2 · b and p2 > ¸(p1), from the de¯nition of ¸(p1) we have b(m²
2 ¡ ¹²
1(c²
1;b)) + p1 < p2
for ² su±ciently small. Then, the proposed strategy pro¯le is a Nash equilibrium of °²,
and it converges to S1 as ² converges to 0.
Next, we show that for any ² su±ciently small, there exists some game °² that does not
have a Nash equilibrium close to any other matching market structure. Consider a sequence
{ 25 {of games f°²g²!0 where both m²
1 and m²
2 are close to b for all ². (This is possible because
we can make the probability of tremble for the highest type converge to 0 in¯nitely slower
than all other types.) To rule out D12, suppose that for each °², there is a Nash equilibrium
in which both matchmakers have a strictly positive market share, and let c²
1 < c²
2 < b be
the thresholds in such equilibrium. Then c²
1 and c²
2 must solve equations (2.2) or (2.3),
with ¹²
1 and ¹²
2 in place of the conditional means in the two markets. However, since
p2 > ¸(p1), as ² becomes small, neither of the above systems of equations has a solution,
a contradiction. To rule out S2, suppose that there is a sequence of equilibria for ² going
to zero, such that in the limit only matchmaker 2 has a positive market share. In such
sequence, the marginal participating type c²
2 in market 2 must converge to the solution






1 converging to c²
2, or somewhere in between. Since p2 > µ(p1),
for ² su±ciently small c²
2 will strictly prefer joining market 1, a contradiction. Finally,
to rule out the null market structure, suppose that there is a sequence of equilibria such
that in the limit neither matchmaker has a positive market share. In any such sequence,
market 1's quality is m²
1. Since m²
1 is arbitrarily close to b and p1 < b2, for ² su±ciently
small, the highest type agents will strictly prefer joining market 1 to not participating, a
contradiction.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3.1
First, note that only a dual matching market structure with strictly positive revenues
for both matchmakers is a candidate for equilibrium outcome. This is because for any
competitor's price, say p1, the other matchmaker can earn a strictly positive revenue by
either overtaking or undercutting.
Second, in any dual matching market structure, by using the overtaking strategy each
matchmaker can earn a revenue strictly greater than the competitor, which is impossible.
To see this point, without loss of generality suppose that 0 < p1 · p2 < b2 and consider the
dual matching market structure D12. The participation threshold c1 and c2 are determined
by equation (2.2), or in the case of c1 = a, by equation (2.3). If matchmaker 2 charges
a price just above p1, say p1 + ²0, then in the case of c1 > a, matchmaker 2 becomes a
monopolist and the participation threshold c0 is determined as in (2.1). Comparing the
{ 26 {two equations c0¹(c0;b) = p1 + ²0 and c1¹(c1;c2) = p1, we conclude that c0 < c1 for some
²0 slightly greater than zero. In the case of c1 = a, matchmaker 2 becomes a monopolist
by charging a price just above p1, and the participation threshold c0 = a. In either case,
matchmaker 2 earns a strictly greater revenue in deviation than matchmaker 1 does in the
dual matching market structure through a higher price and a larger matching market.
Similarly, given p2, if matchmaker 1 overtakes with a price just above p2, say p2 +²00,
then matchmaker 1 becomes a monopolist and the participation threshold c00 is determined
as in (2.1). Since c2¹(c2;b) = p2 +c2¹(c1;c2)¡p1 > p2 +c1¹(c1;c2)¡p1 ¸ p2, for some ²00
slightly greater than zero, we have c00 < c2. Thus, matchmaker 1 earns a strictly greater
revenue in deviation than matchmaker 2 in the dual market structure.
A.3. Lemma A.1 and Proof
Lemma A.1. The revenue function of a one-price monopolist is quasi-concave in price p.
Proof. Consider the equivalent problem of choosing a threshold c ¸ a to maximize (1¡
F(c))c¹(c;b). If the optimal threshold ^ c is interior then it satis¯es the ¯rst order condition
½(^ c)¹(^ c;b) ¡ ^ c2 = 0. Since ¹l(c;b) · 1 and ½0(c) · 0, the derivative of ½(c)¹(c;b) ¡ c2 is
less than ½(c) ¡ 2c, which is less than 0 at any ^ c that satis¯es the ¯rst order condition. It
follows that the monopolist's revenue function is quasi-concave in c. Since the revenue is
simply p for p < a¹(a;b) and there is a one-to-one relation between c and p for p ¸ a¹(a;b)
(given by 2.1), the revenue function is also quasi-concave in p.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 3.3
We only need to show that for any p1 2 [^ p;¸(^ p)], any best response of matchmaker 2 leaves
zero revenue to matchmaker 1. For any such price p1, matchmaker 2 has at most four
viable options. (i) Matchmaker 2 can overtake by charging p2 2 (p1;µ(p1)]. By quasi-
concavity, matchmaker 2's maximum overtaking revenue is (1 ¡ F(c2))p1, with a price p2
arbitrarily close to p1, and c2 satisfying c2¹(c2;b) = p1 by (2.1). (ii) Matchmaker 2 can
undercut by charging p2 2 [0;¸¡1(p1)] (when ¸¡1(p1) is de¯ned). Since p1 · ¸(^ p), by
the quasi-concavity the maximum undercutting revenue is (1¡F(c2))¸¡1(p1) obtained by
charging p2 = ¸¡1(p1), where c2 satis¯es c2¹(c2;b) = ¸¡1(p1) by (2.1). (iii) Matchmaker
2 can allow the dual structure D12 by charging p2 2 [µ(p1);¸(p1)]. However, this option
{ 27 {is dominated by the option of overtaking by the quasi-concavity. (iv) Matchmaker 2 can
allow the dual structure D21 by charging p2 2 (¸¡1(p1);µ¡1(p1)). We want to use the
assumption of uniform type distribution to show that option (iv) is never optimal because
it is dominated by either overtaking or undercutting. Note that the maximum overtaking
revenue decreases with p1, while the maximum undercutting revenue increases in p1. In
addition, because for ¯xed p2 < p1 as p1 increases c2 either decreases or does not change
and c1 increases (see equations (2.2) and (2.3), with the roles of the two matchmakers
reversed), matchmaker 2's maximum revenue in D21 is increasing in p1.
The argument for ruling out p2 2 (¸¡1(p1);µ¡1(p1)) relies on two claims. The ¯rst is
that there is a critical price p such that for any p1 ¸ p matchmaker 2's maximum revenue
as a duopolist is achieved at the boundary between S2 and D21. Then, the maximum
revenue as a duopolist coincides with the maximum undercutting revenue for any p1 ¸ p,
with zero revenue for matchmaker 1. The second claim is that at p1 = p the maximum
undercutting revenue is smaller than the maximum overtaking revenue. For any p1 < p,
the maximum revenue as a duopolist is achieved in the interior of the D21 region. However,
for ¯xed p2, the revenue to matchmaker 2 in D21 is increasing in p1, and so its maximum
revenue is also increasing in p1. Since the maximum overtaking revenue is decreasing in p1,
it follows from the second claim that the maximum revenue as a duopolist for any p1 < p
is smaller than the maximum overtaking revenue at the same p1.
The derivation of p and the proof of the two claims depend on whether the price pair
(p;¸¡1(p)) is located at the boundary between D21 and S2 where c2 > a or c2 = a. We
will assume c2 > a; the other case is similar. Consider the problem of choosing c2 to
maximize the revenue for matchmaker 2 in D21, given by (F(c1)¡F(c2))c2¹(c2;c1), where
c1 satis¯es p1 = c1(¹(c1;b)¡¹(c2;c1))+c2¹(c2;c1). Under the uniform type distribution,
the above relation becomes p1 = 1
2(c1b+c2
2), and so dc1=dc2 = ¡2c2=b. One can verify that














2 = 0: (A:1)
Since c1 = b at the boundary between S2 and D21, there is a unique p1 = 4
7b2 such that
(A.1) holds with equality at p2 = ¸¡1(p1). Further, straightforward calculations reveal
{ 28 {that at p1 = 4
7b2, matchmaker 2's maximum undercutting revenue is smaller than its
maximum overtaking revenue. Thus, we have established both claims mentioned above.
A.5. Lemma A.2 and Proof
Lemma A.2. Under the uniform type distribution, matchmaker 2's revenue function is
concave in c2 for any p1 in the D12 region.
Proof. There are three cases, depending on p1. In the ¯rst case, we have p1 · a2, which
implies c1 = a. Under uniform type distribution, the derivative of (3.5) with respect to c2 is
proportional to ¡p1+(b¡a)(b¡2c2)=2: Thus, matchmaker 2's revenue is concave in c2. In
the second case, we have p1 ¸ a¹(a;b), which implies c1 > a and given by c1¹(c1;c2) = p1.
Under uniform type distribution, using constraint (3.6) and di®erentiating (3.5) twice with
respect to c2, we ¯nd that the revenue function is concave in c2, if
¡
µ








This is equivalent to ¡b(c1 + c2) + 2c2
1 ¡ c1c2 < 0, which is true because c1 · c2 · b.
In the third case, we have p1 2 (a2;a¹(a;b)), and there is a critical value c2 satisfying
a¹(a;c2) = p1 such that c1 > a for c2 < c2 and c1 = a for c2 ¸ c2. By constraint (3.6),
c1 decreases in c2 to the left of c2 and is constant to the right. It then follows from the
revenue function (3.5) that the derivative with respect to c2 jumps down at c2. Since the
revenue function is concave to either side of the kink, it is globally concave in c2.
A.6. Proof of Lemma 3.9
We only need to consider the case where the e±cient c¤
1 for the planner is interior. By
di®erentiating the objective function (3.13) with respect to c1, we ¯nd that the e±cient
thresholds c¤
1 and c¤




1) = 0: It then
follows from (3.9) that ½(c¤
1) > c¤
1. Since ½(^ c1) · ^ c1 by Proposition 3.5, the lemma follows
from Assumption 2.2.
A.7. Proof of Lemma 3.10
Using the identity
(F(c2) ¡ F(c1))¹(c1;c2) + (1 ¡ F(c2))¹(c2;b) = (1 ¡ F(c1))¹(c1;b); (A:2)
{ 29 {we can rewrite the objective function of the planner (3.13) as
(1 ¡ F(c1))(¹2(c1;b) + (¹(c1;b) ¡ ¹(c1;c2))(¹(c2;b) ¡ ¹(c1;b)));
and the objective function of the monopolist (3.2) as
(1 ¡ F(c1))(c1¹(c1;b) + (¹(c1;b) ¡ ¹(c1;c2))(c2 ¡ c1)):
Note that for the monopolist for any c1 adding a second market always increases its revenue.











for the planner's problem, and
¹r(c1;^ c2)
¹(c1;b) ¡ ¹(c1;^ c2)
=
1
^ c2 ¡ c1
(A:4)
for the monopolist's problem. It follows from comparing (A.3) to (A.4) that c¤




for any c2. This holds if ¹(¢;b) is linear, including the uniform type distribution.
In the proof of Proposition 3.8 we have already established that for any c1 there is a
unique ^ c2 that satis¯es the ¯rst order condition (A.4). It remains to argue that there is
a unique interior solution in c¤
2 to the planner's problem. Using equation (A.2), we can








For any c1, there exists at least one c¤
2 that satis¯es the above ¯rst order condition, as
¹(c1;c1) + ¹(c1;b) ¸ 2c1 and ¹(c1;b) + ¹(b;b) · 2b. Such c¤
2 is unique too, because under
Assumption 2.2 we have ¹r(c1;c2) + ¹l(c2;b) · 1
2 + 1 < 2 for any c2.
A.8. Lemma A.3 and Proof
Lemma A.3. Under the uniform type distribution, there is no equilibrium with a dual
market structure when a=b ¸ 1
2.
{ 30 {Proof. Condition (3.8) is necessary for an equilibrium with D12 and a matchmaker 1's
price ~ p1 > a2. This is because for any such ~ p1, matchmaker 2 has the option of charging
p2 = µ(~ p1) to overtake matchmaker 1, which leads to c1 > a. Under uniform distribution
(3.8) becomes c1 < (
p
19 ¡ 4)b, and since it cannot be satis¯ed when a=b ¸ 1
2, there is
no equilibrium with a dual market structure in which ~ p1 > a2. Further, condition (3.1) is
necessary for an equilibrium with ~ p1 · a2; this is because for any such ~ p1, matchmaker 2
can overtake matchmaker 1 by charging p2 = µ(~ p1), which leads to c1 = a. This condition
is violated for any ~ p1 if ¹(a;b) · 3
2a, or a=b ¸ 1
2 for the uniform distribution.
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